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D7IBCAPC Oral Argument 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 CAPITAL RECORDS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, et al.,, 4 5 Plaintiffs, 6 09 CV 10101 (RA) V. 7 VIMEO, LLC, a Delaware limitied liability company doing business as Vimeo.com, 8 et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 New York, N.Y. July 18, 2013 12 10:13 a.m. 13 Before: 14 HON. RONNIE ABRAMS, 15 District Judge 16 **APPEARANCES** 17 MITCHELL SILBERBERG & KNUPP LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs RUSSELL J. FRACKMAN 18 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 19 Attorneys for Defendants 20 ROBERT L. RASKOPF RACHEL HERRICK KASSABIAN 21 TODD ANTEN JESSICA A. ROSE 22 ALSO PRESENT: 23 JAMES BERKLEY, Paralegal 24 25

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(In open court)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: In the matter of Capital Records v. Vimeo, Docket Number 09 Civil 10101.

Counsel, please state your name for the record.

MR. FRACKMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Russell Frackman, Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp. With me is James Berkley, a paralegal from our law firm.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. RASKOPF: Good morning, your Honor. Robert Raskopf from Quinn Emanuel with my colleagues, Jessica Rose, Todd Anten and Rachek Kassabian.

THE COURT: Good morning. We're here for oral argument on Vimeo's motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment.

I have the morning set aside. How long do you expect your presentation to take?

MR. RASKOPF: I think, Judge, our presentation just straight out will be maybe 40 minutes.

THE COURT: I think that makes sense because it will give each of you time to respond.

MR. RASKOPF: All right. We'll try to keep it to 40, maybe 45 tops.

THE COURT: Okay. That sounds good. We've been having problems with the acoustics in the courthouse since we've returned here. So I would just encourage you to speak

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into the microphone or at the podium, because there's a microphone there, as well.

MR. RASKOPF: Will do.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we start with you, with Vimeo.

MR. RASKOPF: Thank you, your Honor. I appreciate it.

So, as I said, my name is Robert Raskopf. My colleagues at the counsel table here. I would like the Court to know that also representing Vimeo in the courtroom today are Michael Cheah, Vimeo's general counsel.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. RASKOPF: And Ed Ferguson, who is associate general counsel of Interactive Corp.--

MR. FERGUSON: Good morning, your Honor --

MR. RASKOPF: -- which is Vimeo's parent company.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. RASKOPF: Your Honor, we all think Vimeo is a picture-perfect candidate for complete DMCA safe harbor protection and we plan to show you why this morning.

So what is Vimeo? Vimeo identifies itself as "Video and You." Vimeo hosts and enables the sharing of original, high-quality, user-generated videos. It was started by a couple of guys in a garage -- maybe not in a garage, but working part time -- in 2004, nine years ago, which is a century ago by internet standards. But Vimeo now has 12.3

million users who upload 43,000 videos a day. Vimeo is one of the 130 most-visited websites on the entire internet.

THE COURT: Approximately how many employees does Vimeo have?

MR. RASKOPF: Vimeo now has approximately 74 employees. At the time this complaint was filed in 2009, it had 20 employees.

There are over 31 million videos at Vimeo. I should tell the Court that Vimeo is also an award-winning website. It provides notable user tools and quality video technology.

Vimeo is basically for anyone interested in video. It's the prototypical success story that Congress sought to enable when it enacted the DMCA 15 years ago.

Organizations like the White House, CNN, the New York
Times, Yale Law School, the Metropolitan Museum, Viacom, Warner
Brothers, are registered Vimeo users. You've got entertainers
like Beyoncé, Van Halen, Jason Reitman. They have accounts.
At Vimeo, Judge, you can see home videos, animation,
documentaries, indie films, shorts, time-lapse videos.
Original user-generated videos are the touchstone of the
company's business.

So Vimeo just can't, doesn't, and isn't designed to review every video that's uploaded every day. As your Honor asked, and as I told you, we had 20 employees in 2009, when the complaint was started, filed, and we're up to 74 now. But any

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way you do the math, Vimeo doesn't work that way. It can't work that way. Basic Vimeo membership, I should tell your Honor, is free of charge. There are some enhanced services available, for example, for a fee through a Vimeo Plus membership.

So, Judge, what does Vimeo represent? It's an appealing product. It promotes creativity, above all else. It's an acclaimed corporate citizen. It's a clear winner in the internet space. So why is Vimeo here? Well, that is the one question I think only plaintiffs can answer. Because in this case I know that the plaintiffs' agenda is not to have clips with their music taken down expeditiously. It's not to follow the DMCA. Both before and after they filed their case against Vimeo, whenever they sent us, Vimeo, a DMCA notice, we took down the identified clips expeditiously. This is an ambush. No DMCA notice ever came. They just filed. After we got the complaint, we took down the clips anyway, just so your Honor knows.

Now, your Honor, there are a set or a series of requirements, sort of introductory requirements, for an ISP, an internet service provider, to qualify for DMCA safe harbor. Let me call them the structural requirements because they don't pertain directly to the clips in suit, the 199 clips in suit. In a nutshell, Judge, once DMCA's -- DMCA compliance system has to be up and running.

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My partner, Rachek Kassabian, with the Court's permission, will address DMCA's system now, but then I would return, with your Honor's permission, to just deal with the case-specific question of whether under Viacom, the Viacom decision of the Second Circuit, Vimeo had knowledge of or was willfully blind to any of the 199 clips in suit. Sneak peak, The answer is no, not a single one. Judge:

With the Court's permission, may I turn it over to Rachel?

THE COURT: Yes, absolutely.

MR. RASKOPF: Thank you.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Good morning, your Honor.

Rachek Kassabian of Ouinn Emanuel for Vimeo.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: As the Court knows, and as my colleague, Mr. Raskopf, just alluded to, the DMCA lays out a series of requirements that all ISPs must meet in order to obtain safe harbor. We've briefed them extensively for your Honor and we believe that Vimeo satisfies them all.

With your permission, your Honor, we'd like to hand up a small binder with a few demonstratives in it for your reference and convenience. We've shared them with opposing counsel about 20 minutes ago.

May we approach?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: So, your Honor, at Tab 1 you'll just find a nice, handy list of the prerequisites for safe harbor, but I'd like to tick through and demonstrate Vimeo's satisfaction of each.

First, of course, you have to be a service provider to claim safe harbor, and Vimeo is. The plaintiffs don't dispute that. In fact, on the very first page of their brief, they call Vimeo a service provider.

Next, of course, you have to have a registered agent for receiving notices and a working DMCA notification system. It is undisputed that Vimeo has both of those things. And I would refer the Court to paragraph 31 of our statement of undisputed facts, where those facts are not in dispute in this case. Vimeo has had a registered agent for more than seven years, and Vimeo's policies and procedures for complying with the DMCA are all laid out in its on-line terms of service.

Next, you have to have adopted and reasonably implemented a repeat infringer policy. And Vimeo has done that. By that what I mean is Vimeo terminates the accounts of users whose uploaded videos have been the subject of multiple DMCA notices.

THE COURT: Can we actually talk about this for a minute? In your view, what's the relevant date for determining

whether Vimeo had an adequate repeat infringer policy?

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Well, your Honor, the closest authority we have found for that is the Wolk v. Kodak case from this district last year, which basically looked at the time period in which a DMCA complaint, or rather notice, was sent to the service provider. And the Court looked, at that time frame, what was the status of the repeat infringer policy?

So here, of course, we don't have the benefit of having ever received a DMCA notice from the plaintiffs regarding the 199 videos in suit. The closest thing we have is the complaint itself. So it's our position that that's the relevant time period. You look to when we received some form of notice. A complaint is not a compliant DMCA notice, as cases like *Perfect Ten v. Amazon* have held, but that's the closest thing we have here to a DMCA notice. So that would be December of 2009.

THE COURT: I should just ask, what evidence is there that Vimeo had adopted a repeat infringer policy prior to 2008?

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: That would be in the Cheah declaration, your Honor. And let me grab my list of exhibits.

THE COURT: Sure. Just while you're getting that, the Purgatory tool was implemented in November of 2008. Is that right?

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MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: That's right. So Purgatory basically automated the process on a larger scale because at that point, by the fall of 2008, Vimeo was receiving more DMCA notices. Obviously its service was growing, it was becoming more popular. So it chose to automate the process and implement a software program to help it track repeat infringers. Before that -- and, your Honor, that's the Supplemental Cheah Declaration Exhibit 4 that talks about before that.

So before Purgatory was implemented, the record is undisputed that Vimeo was receiving roughly five or less DMCA notices per month. That's about one e-mail a week. So in that earlier time period, what Vimeo did was tracked repeat infringers manually. And typically Vimeo would actually terminate accounts after receiving only a single or maybe two notices. One or two strikes, in other words, was often sufficient to terminate an account back in those early days.

> THE COURT: Is there any documentary evidence of that? MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Yes.

THE COURT: I see you're turning to Exhibit 4.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Yes. Exhibit 4 shows examples of user accounts that were terminated by Vimeo under the repeat infringer policy before November of 2008, when the process became more automated.

THE COURT: Okay. And let me just ask you one more

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question. When did Vimeo start using rap sheets?

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Sorry. I just wanted to make sure I made that clear on the record. It's the Supplemental Cheah Declaration at Exhibit 4 that has the pre-November 2008 examples of terminations of accounts.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: The rap sheet was implemented right around the same time, in the fall of 2008.

So Vimeo has terminated thousands of accounts over the years, many of which were terminated for specifically violating Vimeo's repeat infringer policy. And Vimeo does more than simply terminate accounts. It actually goes above and beyond what the DMCA requires in at least two ways: When an account is terminated, Vimeo tracks that e-mail address and makes sure that a new account is not opened with that same e-mail address. It's not a requirement, but Vimeo does it. Vimeo also uses software technology to make sure that the same file, video file, that was blocked as a result of a DMCA notice is not simply reuploaded again in a different account by a different user.

Now, on this issue, EMI tries to manufacture some dispute by saying, Well, we don't like the manner in which you've implemented your policy. We don't like the fact that if multiple DMCA notices can come in within the space of a three-day period, you count that as a single strike.

Well, that's an immaterial quibble with our policy because, as we know, Congress left it to ISPs to define the precise contours of their policies based on what makes business sense as long as the letter and spirit of the repeat infringer policy requirement was implemented. And we know this not just from Congress, but also from the Viacom decision, where a very similar argument was made by Viacom regarding YouTube's policy.

So YouTube also has a policy of considering multiple notices received within a certain time frame as a single strike for purposes of tracking repeat infringers. And the Court rejected Viacom's argument and found that policy reasonable at page 528 of the first district court decision in Viacom.

So the bottom line here is that reasonable implementation is what's required and that's what Vimeo has done. There are no dispute on the material facts of Vimeo's repeat infringer policy.

If your Honor doesn't have any other questions about repeat infringer, I'm happy to move on to the next element.

THE COURT: You may. Thank you.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: So, finally, Vimeo has to not interfere with standard technical measures used by rights holders. This is an easy one because no statute and no Court has ever defined or identified any agreed-upon standard technical measure. There do not appear to be any at the moment in the law that have to be observed.

And certainly in the briefing plaintiffs have not identified any candidates either. All they point to is the fact that Vimeo users have the options of making their videos private. They argue that somehow that's an interference with standard technical measures, but it's not. There's no authority holding that a privacy feature offered to website users would automatically disqualify you as an ISP from seeking safe harbor. It doesn't make any sense. In fact, there are many, many video websites that offer such a privacy feature for users. It's not an interference with the standard technical measure.

THE COURT: Does that make it harder for them if they go on Vimeo to find potentially infringing videos?

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Your Honor, if a video is marked private, it can only be viewed by the account holders who have authorization and anyone they choose to share it with. So if it's not shared with a copyright holder, they would not see it, nor would anyone else.

THE COURT: Right. So if they went on Vimeo and they did a search for Let It Be or some other song, and there were some videos that had the song Let It Be on it that were password protected, those videos would not come up in that search.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: That's exactly right. And we know from the *Viacom* Second Circuit decision that offering or

limiting access to user tools, such as in the *Viacom* case content I.D. tools, does not constitute interference with standard technical measures. And that's at page 41 of the Second Circuit decision. So that issue has already been

decided in this circuit.

And the Wolk v. Kodak case found very similarly.

There, there was a photo editing feature that the plaintiff was claiming allowed users — not the service, but users — to, if they wanted, to take off copyright watermarks. Obviously the editing tool could be used for any number of things and that was one of the things that the plaintiffs said constituted an interference with the standard technical measure.

And Wolk, just like the Second Circuit in Viacom said, no, offering user tools like that is not an interference. And, of course, the person using that tool, if for alleged nefarious purposes, if they chose to remove a watermark would be the user, not the service.

So those two decisions have rejected arguments very similar to what the plaintiffs are making here.

So, your Honor, having satisfied the prerequisites for safe harbor, I'd like to move on and talk about the specific requirements under Section 512(c) for safe harbor for user-generated content sites. And you'll see at Tab 2 in your binder, we've got just for a reference tool the handy checklist of requirements. And let me walk through them and tell you why

they're all satisfied here.

So there's no question that Vimeo stores videos at the direction of its users. That is undisputed, and I'd refer the Court to paragraph 5 of the statement of undisputed facts.

Now, again, to try to create a dispute here on this record, EMI says, well, okay, fine, maybe you do store videos at the direction of users, but you also let users download those videos. So that download feature can't qualify for safe harbor. That's not stored at the direction of the user. But that argument has already been rejected at least twice.

We know from the *UMG v. Shelter Capital* case in the Ninth Circuit that downloading does qualify as a storage-related function because it's part of the ISP's service to facilitate access to user-uploaded materials. And we also know from the Second Circuit's *Viacom* decision that -- and I'm quoting here -- "The safe harbor extends to software functions performed for the purpose of facilitating access to user-stored material." That's at page 39 of the Second Circuit's opinion. And there functions like transcoding and playback were at issue, which *Viacom* argued was not part of storage at the direction of a user, and the Second Circuit rejected that argument. So there are no triable issues on that issue.

Second, Vimeo does not have the right and ability to control infringing activity on its service. It is undisputed that Vimeo cannot control what a user chooses to upload to

Vimeo's website. And, of course, courts are clear, crystal clear, that the right or ability to take down content that might be complained about — for instance, in a DMCA notice — after the fact, that doesn't satisfy the "right and ability to control" test. Because of course if it did, then the takedown requirements in one section of the DMCA would automatically disqualify you under the "right and ability to control" prong in another part of the DMCA.

So instead the Second Circuit in Viacom said, well, something more is required. The service provider must exert "substantial influence on the activities of its users." And in defining what that means, the Second Circuit pointed to two examples. First they said, well, there's the Cybernet case out in California. That is the only reported decision that we're aware of -- and it was the one that the Viacom case pointed to -- where the service provider was found to have the right and ability to control infringement on its site. And there, of course, what I Cybernet was doing was it was monitoring prescreening and providing editing instructions and final approvals to each and every account holder that wanted to join Cybernet's Adult Check service.

So that's one way you can have a right and ability to control if you're prescreening and editing and actively participating in each and every file or video uploaded to your system.

The other way that the Second Circuit pointed to is Grokster. The Court said, well, okay, if you are inducing, actively participating in, encouraging, facilitating infringement on a massive scale, à la Grokster, that could constitute right and ability to control in certain circumstances.

So here the plaintiffs have pointed to certain curating features on Vimeo and they say that's it. That's the substantial influence that the Second Circuit was talking about, but it's not. So, for instance, they say, well, Vimeo offers technical assistance and answers questions when users submit them. But, you know, offering a standard tech support desk and responding to user questions, as most websites do, at least the ones we like, does not make Vimeo in any way, shape or form an active participant in what users end up doing or not doing with whatever answers they might receive in response to their questions to tech support. But offering tech support does not, again, defeat safe harbor for ISPs.

THE COURT: I guess one question I have is how a service provider as big as Vimeo or YouTube would ever be found to have the right and ability to control infringing content if prescreening was always required.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: So the Second Circuit said it's not always required. Right? It is one example of active participation. Now, in *Cybernet* it was prescreening of every

single video— or, sorry, every single account, but the Court also said if there is active inducement and participation in user infringements, encouragement of infringement, like there was in Grokster and similar P2P file sharing cases, the Court said that's another scenario where you could be found to have the right and ability to control.

But I guess what I'm saying here, your Honor, is our facts are not even anywhere in that universe. So hypothetically what facts could there be to find right and ability to control? I can imagine a number of scenarios that might fit under the Second Circuit's analysis, but we're not even close to that here so it's immaterial in terms of what could be the case. Discovery's closed. The record's closed. There's nothing even approaching inducement à la Grokster or the type of Cybernet-style active participation in editing and scripting and approving particular content that's going up on a site.

Plaintiffs also point to moderator tools. They say, well, Vimeo has these moderator tools. They allow employees to tag videos or mark videos after they've been posted. And they say, well, that's substantial influence over the content of the videos, and of course it's not. The videos have already been created by the user and uploaded by the user. Flagging it or tagging it or marking it after the fact does not in any way have any impact on the substance of the video and whether it's

infringing or not. But even if it did, the record is undisputed that far less than even 1 percent of all of the videos on Vimeo have ever been interacted with via a moderator tool in any way.

THE COURT: I don't have that chart in front of me, but of the 199, it was somewhere, I think, between 55 and 61 that had been interacted with—

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: That's right.

THE COURT: -- in some way. Is that right?

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: That's right. Fifty-five I believe was the number.

THE COURT: And were any of those plaintiffs -- sorry. Give me one second.

(Pause)

THE COURT: This is one of them. I'm just looking at one that appears was not interacted with in any way. Let's take Let It Be from the Beatles just as an example. If an employee had seen that and either put on a like to it or buried it or done something else, with a song that's so well known, what, if any, obligation would you think that employee had?

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Your Honor, I think that the mere presence of commercial music, especially a song that's 40 years old, 30 years old, I do not think that that rises to the level of saying that there is some knowledge conferred and some obligation to do something about it in the absence of anything

else.

We all know that the use of commercial music or any kind of music in a video or other creative enterprise can certainly be authorized. It can be a fair use. It just might not even be something that the copyright holder cares about. It may be something that they actually like or aren't bothered by. So, no, it would not be a clear example of infringement.

I should also say, your Honor, that Mr. Raskopf is going to address knowledge --

THE COURT: Yes, I jumped around. I apologize for that. You can continue the way you were proceeding.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: That's okay. But in terms of right and ability to control, again, moderator tools, flagging a tiny, tiny, minuscule percentage of all of the videos on Vimeo, in any way marking it, however you might—however the plaintiffs have described it, none of that has anything to do, though, with right and ability to control, the actual creation and uploading of the content.

And, of course, next they say, well, Vimeo has guidelines for use of its site. So that constitutes substantial influence on the videos uploaded to the site, but that also doesn't satisfy the test. I mean, virtually every user-generated content site out there has guidelines, has rules, terms of service. We've all seen them.

The most recent on remand Viacom district court

decision by Judge Stanton just three months ago held specifically that "enforcing basic rules regarding content, such as limitations on violent, sexual or hate material" does not constitute evidence of right and ability to control. And that is at page 9 of the Westlaw citation for the remanded district court decision.

THE COURT: In analyzing right and ability to control, should I be looking at the total videos on Vimeo that employees interact with or only the 199?

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Your Honor, I think that the Second Circuit opinion established that there's no specific knowledge requirement for right and ability to control. It can be more on a platformwide or sitewide basis. Either way it's not satisfied here.

In fact, I mean, to suggest— I mean, the rule that the plaintiffs really take issue with here in terms of Vimeo's guidelines is they say, hey, you know, you prohibit infringing content. You encourage original context. You tell people not to upload rips and music videos. It's just ironic that that would be a term of service or a guideline that the plaintiffs would use or take issue with to try to suggest that Vimeo should be deprived of safe harbor for discouraging infringement. So that just doesn't come close to satisfying the test.

Instead it's clear from the thrust of the plaintiffs'

brief is that what they're really saying is we think Vimeo has the right and ability to control because they're the next *Grokster*. That's really what they're saying here. They allege, accuse, that Vimeo induces, actively participates in user infringement of those 43,000 videos uploaded every single day on a massive and sitewide scale like a peer-to-peer file-sharing service. And nothing could be further from the truth. There is no evidence whatsoever in the record to support that accusation.

They say, well, okay, there's a handful of e-mails where there are some stray comments from employees that we don't like. And they say, oh, well, there's some lip dubs. There's a couple of lip dub videos where people are singing along and dancing around to a song and horsing around and they put up the video on Vimeo of a lip dub. And they say, well, you know, that kind of evidence equates to the kind of massive sitewide fostering of infringement that courts have found in the P2P file-sharing cases. And, again, it's just not a credible argument.

I think probably the first Viacom district court decision said it best when it said, "The Grokster model does not comport with that of a service provider who furnishes a platform on which its users post and access all sorts of materials as they wish." And that's at page 514 of the first district court decision. A platform that receives and

processes DMCA notices like Vimeo, it's not a *Grokster*. A platform that's a good internet citizen like Vimeo is not a *Grokster*.

You can just see the difference in the P2P cases that the plaintiff cites that they just have no application here. In *Grokster* the Court found that 90 percent of the files on that platform were infringing. In Aimster the Court found that Aimster "predicates its entire service upon furnishing a road map for users to find, copy and distribute copyrighted music."

Obviously, Vimeo doesn't do anything like that.

This is not Arista v. Lime Group either, which the plaintiffs also cite, where the Court found that the LimeWire service was "overwhelmingly for infringement." The P2P cases have no application here and this argument in support of a claim that Vimeo as a platform for uploading and hosting user videos somehow falls within that paradigm just doesn't hold water. There is no right and ability to control here.

And, fourth, even if Vimeo could control what users choose to upload 43,000 times a day, it does not receive any direct financial benefit attributable to that infringing activity. It's undisputed that Vimeo users pay nothing to view content. It's also undisputed that the vast majority of Vimeo's revenues come in the form of subscription fees for premium accounts. And the account holders who choose to have premium accounts, they pay the same regardless of what types of

videos they choose to create and upload to Vimeo's system. And we know from the 1998 House and Senate reports preceding the enactment of the DMCA that that sort of a content-neutral, flat service fee is not the type of direct financial benefit that Congress was talking about.

Now, Vimeo also receives some revenues from advertising, as described in the Mellencamp declaration. But that advertising is not contextual in that it does not depend on the type of video posted; whether the video is infringing, whether it has music, whether it doesn't. That has no impact on the advertising.

Same with the so-called house ads that the plaintiffs point to. They say, well, you have ads for Vimeo premium accounts on some of these pages so that must be a direct financial benefit, but it's not. There's no evidence at all in the record that any users have ever signed up for a premium account because they saw and clicked on and followed through with an ad that was displayed on a web page displaying an allegedly infringing video.

And, lastly, I think plaintiffs say, well, music is a draw on Vimeo, so that is a direct financial benefit. But of course they're conflating music with infringing music. Music being a draw is completely immaterial. The whole world likes music. It's not a draw-- offering music and having that attract people to your site has nothing to do with direct

financial benefit under the DMCA. You have to show that people are coming to your site and using it and you're making money specifically because you offer a haven for infringement. And of course Vimeo doesn't and there's no record of that.

We also know from the 2013 Ninth Circuit Shelter
Capital decision that just offering commercial music or using
commercial music in videos is not the type of draw regarding
infringement that the Congress was talking about regarding the
financial benefit prong. So there's no evidence, no
connection of any kind, between any infringement and any
financial benefit that Vimeo might receive as part of its
service.

And, finally, under the last prong of the safe harbor test you have to, as an ISP, respond expeditiously to any DMCA notice that you receive. And of course this is an easy one here because of the 199 videos in suit, not one of them was subject to a DMCA notice. Vimeo did not receive any DMCA notices regarding any of the 199 videos in suit.

So that means that Vimeo was not obligated to expeditiously respond to anything, but it doesn't matter because Vimeo did. Upon receiving the complaint in the middle of December of 2009, right before the holidays, Vimeo treated this lawsuit like a DMCA notice, even though there's no obligation to do that, and it expeditiously blocked all of the videos at issue in the attachments to the complaint within a

couple of weeks. And that is expeditious under any standard.

There's no case that I'm aware of finding that a two-week

processing time period for a noncompliant DMCA notice is not

expeditious; or even, frankly, for a compliant one.

In sum, your Honor, I really appreciate the time you've given me here today to share this with you. We don't think there are any hard questions at all here. We think this is a very clean, open-and-shut case, just involving a direct application of the Second Circuit's Viacom decision to our undisputed record here.

We think that Vimeo's system under the DMCA is compliant, it's reasonable, and we satisfy the test. This is precisely the type of case that the DMCA was meant to apply to.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Thank you. I'd like to turn it back over to Mr. Raskopf to discuss Vimeo's lack of knowledge of the videos in suit.

MR. RASKOPF: Thank you, your Honor. So let's turn to those 199 clips in suit.

THE COURT: Yes. I'm sorry I got ahead of myself there. I apologize.

MR. RASKOPF: Well, you're way ahead of me, too, so I'm glad to see that.

We already know from Viacom that some general

awareness that there's some infringing activity on the website can't be substituted for knowledge of a particular clip in suit. No general information addresses the knowledge requirement. Under Viacom we have three types of knowledge:

Actual knowledge, red flag knowledge, and willful blindness.

Again, all three types of knowledge must concern the particular clips in suit. Generalities don't matter; particulars do.

This can't be disputed.

So what's plaintiffs' evidence of Vimeo's knowledge of the particular clips in suit? And, your Honor, in our demo binder at Tab 5 is a little aid if you would care to look at it as we move forward. And you'll immediately see that your Honor is way ahead of me, if you do, because we identified the 199 clips, which is at the top, and there are only 55 clips in suit. The first 144 of the 199, the plaintiffs have brought you zero proof that Vimeo is even aware of them. Zero. No evidence at all. So under Viacom, absent any knowledge of them, these clips are safe harbored.

So as to the 55 where they even claim that Vimeo was aware of them, let's discuss. The best plaintiffs' evidence shows is that someone at Vimeo watched the video. Now, we dispute that the evidence shows even that. We pointed it out in our opposition and reply brief. We showed you why, on pages 15 to 16 of the brief, a lot of these tools don't necessarily indicate that someone actually watched the video by a mile.

But let's assume arguendo that plaintiff actually proved that Vimeo watched these 55 videos. Well, that's not nearly enough to confer knowledge under Viacom. Because to lose safe harbor under Viacom, Vimeo must encounter infringement that is blatant or obvious — not just a seemingly innocuous home video with music — in order for infringement to be obvious. Vimeo must know a lot more about the music in the video than merely that the video exists.

And what I've done for your Honor is I gave you Tab 6, which I think fairly succinctly outlines the gaps in plaintiffs' case. The demonstrative is entitled "Awareness is not equal to obvious infringement."

So let's just run through the checklist. First, Vimeo has no know that the video contains music. Now, in some cases that means that Vimeo must have watched the video all the way to the end, because that's where the music is, or the part in the middle or some other part. But as I said, let's just go past that. Here's where they fail completely: Vimeo must know that the music is not in the public domain. Is Vimeo supposed to have in mind the public domain status of every song ever made just as it hears the music in the video? What if the person at Vimeo who's looking at the music or listening to the music in the video doesn't recognize it? Does Vimeo know the song at all?

It gets deeper and more difficult for plaintiff as we

move forward. Does Vimeo know that the uploader owns the music in the video? And much of this was made in the Viacom case, the phenomenon of stealth marketing, where you have an owner of copyrighted music who wants a viewer to think that she is looking at an unauthorized copy, when in fact she's not. Stealth marketing, you know, a relatively new marketing tool, but widespread, supposedly adds appeal to the content. So how is Vimeo supposed to know if the music in a particular clip is being stealth marketed in that video?

Let's take another one. Vimeo must know that the uploader doesn't have a license. How is Vimeo supposed to know that?

THE COURT: Let me just ask you this about the entire argument you're making now.

MR. RASKOPF: Sure.

THE COURT: How could a service provider ever be found to have red flag, put aside actual knowledge, in light of the arguments you're making? What would an example of that look like?

MR. RASKOPF: I can give you I think a reasonable example of that, your Honor. Red flag knowledge, one that we think in which it would be fair to argue that red flag knowledge had been established, would be if Vimeo received an e-mail from a user that says, "I just uploaded to Vimeo a complete rip of a feature-length film that I didn't make at the

following URL and I didn't have permission to do it," and that comes into Vimeo.

Now, those are facts that would make a reasonable person conclude that that particular video is obviously or blatantly infringing. That's the standard. So here's an example of a situation in which Vimeo could reasonably be charged with red flag knowledge. The standards are very high. That is the standard which has been set in the Viacom case, so I'm merely reciting to your Honor the law in the circuit. So you have the stealth marketing problem.

Now the licensing problem. How is Vimeo supposed to know whether the thing is licensed or not? And Judge Stanton weighed in on this issue in his first Viacom opinion in 2010. He said, "If an ISP can't determine if the music is licensed just by inspecting it"-- really by inspection-- "it lacks knowledge that the music is infringing."

Vimeo must also -- to have knowledge, to have red flag knowledge-- and every one of these -- this is a cumulative thing. Vimeo has to also know that the copyright holder actually objects to the use of the music in the videos. Again, Judge Stanton wrote about that. And it makes sense. I mean, after all, some artists think it's good business not to object to a video when their music is used in the video. It's good marketing. No problem. I don't object to that. I like it. I'm flourishing because someone else is using my music in a

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way that doesn't hurt me at all. Perfect sense. Marketing 101.

THE COURT: I think they would say, I imagine, that it is hurting them because that means that people aren't buying their songs on iTunes. Instead, they're getting it through Vimeo. Right?

MR. RASKOPF: Well, that depends on the kind of song it is and the kind of video it is. It would depend on a lot of things. But I would say not completely, Judge. And certainly some people would say that and other people would say, no, not at all. I love it that my music is being used in this little video. The point is, how is Vimeo supposed to know? It's not who's right or wrong in that particular debate. It's that we are bystanders in that debate. That's the key. We're an internet service provider.

Finally, Vimeo must be able to tell just by watching the video, by mere inspection, according to Judge Stanton, that the use of the music is not a fair use. Now, this can be—copyright fair use is a fairly complex area. It's, I'd say, daunting for copyright lawyers let alone lay persons. Let's not forget that the entity closest to most, if not all, of these questions that are in Tab 6 of your demo binder is the plaintiff. But they, of course, refuse to send us a DMCA notice.

Now, you don't have to take my word for it how

difficult these determinations are because the very industry association that represented the plaintiffs, the Recording Industry of America, the Recording Industry Association of America, has admitted it. Believe it or not, the RIAA sent the very first DMCA notice to Vimeo, that Vimeo ever received, in April of 2006. That notice concerned eight videos. It's at Tab 8 of your exhibit binder. It's a small exchange, but I'd really like to draw your attention to the correspondence.

Starting at the bottom of the chain, it's the last e-mail in your— in Tab 8 and then we'll work our way up to the front.

So first e-mail is from RIAA. By the way, they come in at-- they notify you that they are antipiracy at riaa.com. So the e-mail chain starts as follows: "I am contacting you on behalf of the RIAA and its member record companies." This is the takedown notice. Now, this is 2008, Judge-- I'm sorry. 2006? Okay. 2006.

So back in 2006, seven years ago, with the DMCA protocol being brand new to him, Vimeo's founder, Jake Lodwick, wrote back to the RIAA. That's the second e-mail. So Jake writes back. He gets a DMCA takedown notice. Get rid of these eight. You guys are infringing, whatever. And Jake writes back, "I received your notice about the removal of music video clips from Vimeo.com. I was happy to remove most of them, but the first three in your list were not actual music videos with the RIAA artists, but rather homemade music videos. Could you

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please clarify your policy on these clips?"

Next e-mail. It's in yellow. I think it's highlighted in yellow, Judge.

THE COURT: It is. Thank you.

MR. RASKOPF: Okay. The next one is sort of a-- the initial stern, and probably canned, response from RIAA back to Jake: "The three videos referenced use sound recordings without permission from the copyright owner. These videos are infringing and must be removed." Standard stuff probably. Just quessing.

To which Jake replies -- and Jake goes back. interested. He writes back, founder of Vimeo, wants to learn the story, trying to work it out, writes back, "Has RIAA pursued legal action for this type of video in the past, using copyrighted music in the background, but with noncopyrighted video playing? I ask because this seems to open a new can of worms for you guys."

Final response from RIAA: "Please disregard our message relating to the following three videos," and those were the three videos that Jake brought to their attention in the first place. So not even the most knowledgeable and ardent defenders of recorded music rights, the owners themselves, claim that every video and music is infringing.

In sum, Judge, none of the 55 videos here raise even a plausible claim for Viacom to find knowledge because of all of

the questions we laid out.

Now, plaintiffs try to salvage 10 of the 55 clips as to which there was someone at Vimeo who may have touched it in some way. And these ten they claim — and it's in your— back to your Tab 5. The little chart that starts with 199 and ends with zero. We're down to the last ten. So these ten supposedly were uploaded by Vimeo employees and, therefore, not stored at the direction of the user. And for various reasons that argument also fails. First—

THE COURT: Can I just stop you before you get into the ones uploaded by employees?

MR. RASKOPF: Sure, Judge.

THE COURT: What relevance, in your view, is there of some of the e-mails in the record— I'm looking at Exhibit 116 and Exhibit 180, for example— where there are questions posed? One e-mail is written to Vimeo and says, "I have noticed several people using copyrighted material on Vimeo. What do you do about this?"

The answer from someone at Vimeo is "Ignoring, but sharing."

Another e-mail, Exhibit 180, "Hey, guys, I see all the time at Vime videos, (for example lip-dub) music being used that is copyrighted. Is there any problem with this? Can I do it? Thanks."

Answer: "We allow it, however if the copyright holder

sent us a legal takedown notice, we would have to comply. Best wishes."

I don't need to go through all of them, but what is your response with what I should do with them?

MR. RASKOPF: They're totally irrelevant. Zero. Every one of those does not deal with a specific clip in suit. It must be the clip in suit under Viacom that is the subject of a discussion in order for there to be any relevance to it. That is where we are here, Judge. None of those e-mails, and there are a few, out of 23,000 documents that we produced in the case, that sort of one-on-one e-mails as opposed to what the whole website -- what people see when they visit the website completely, are relevant.

We have a standard response, and I think we produced something like 80 examples of it, when someone asks us about what do you do with copyright? How do you handle it? There's a standard response in the declaration of Michael Cheah at Exhibit 1. That is exactly what is ordinarily submitted. Okay. The supplemental declaration, not the original declaration.

But the bottom line is, Judge, that these are completely irrelevant because you need knowledge of the particular clip in suit. That's where it has to be. None of those e-mails have anything to do with the 55 that are the subject-- well, it's 199, but 144 there's nothing on them. But

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even the 55, that I've gotten now down to 10, there's not a single connection between one of those e-mails and my clips.

So let's go to the --

THE COURT: Well, just one more question, if I can.

MR. RASKOPF: Sure, Judge.

THE COURT: Why wouldn't it be an issue for the jury, let's say looking at the 55 number, as to what exactly the knowledge was? And if Vimeo, for example, is willfully blind? I mean, why is that an issue for the jury to look at? Look, how does burying exactly work and what did they know? Why is that not a factual question for the jury?

MR. RASKOPF: Because all of those issues, there is no evidence whatsoever in this record -- and we have had a full record. We've had full discovery. There's no evidence in this record -- and it's plaintiffs' burden to come forward with it -- that there was any of these discussions such as, let's say, I don't want to hear about that video or, you know, anything that relates -- there's nothing that relates to the 55 videos. So there is no issue of fact because it hasn't been created.

What we have is simply an association between one-there's no discovery on, an association -- and discovery is over. An association between one video and the video. You know, bury-- bury doesn't even mean that-- buried does not even mean that it was necessarily observed.

But we're past that because even if you assume that they were watched, there's no evidence that there was anything more than that they were watched in this record, and that doesn't nearly get you home under Viacom. It's just not enough— there's no evidence. It's not a question of whether there's something out there that was observed in discovery that is before the Court. There isn't anything. They've completely chronicled everything they had in terms of what Vimeo's relationship is to the 55 videos and not one of them sheds any light on all of the questions that I put to your Honor in that demo tab for the very reason that there's no evidence.

THE COURT: Thank you. I'm sorry, you were starting to talk about employee evidence. I didn't mean to take you off track.

MR. RASKOPF: Sure, Judge.

So, first, of the ten remaining clips in suit, three of them were uploaded by one user named Julia Heffernan, who only later became a Vimeo employee. Long before she became employed by Vimeo. So knowledge of these videos can't be imputed to Vimeo. She wasn't employed by Vimeo when she uploaded them, so they were obviously stored at the direction of a Vimeo user at the time they were uploading.

Three more of the remaining ten were uploaded by people who were never Vimeo employees, Messrs. Fishel and Blumenfeld, who worked on a website called CollegeHumor that's

owned by Connected Ventures, but they don't work for Vimeo.

So those clips, those three clips, were also stored at the direction of a user. So we're really down to four videos as to which is a claim because those videos were, indeed, uploaded by users who were also video employees at the time of the upload. Those clips aren't official Vimeo videos or otherwise made at Vimeo's behest. There's zero proof in this record that Vimeo solicited them, that asked that they be made.

Ms. Dae Mellencamp, Vimeo's president, put in a declaration in this case saying that there are only a couple of videos that are made by Vimeo employees such as those made for the Vimeo Video School. So the four in issue here aren't about Vimeo at all. If you look at them, you'll see in a second that they're not. They're personal videos. I mean, you're not required to quit your membership in the human race or your zest for using Vimeo to upload your personal videos when you become a Vimeo staffer. You're still also a Vimeo user.

So I think holding otherwise would mean that Vimeo staffers would have to stop using Vimeo personally because Vimeo would become automatically responsible for their content. These employees, most, if not all, of whom were Vimeo users long before being Vimeo employees, would need to stop using the video site for their personal videos. So we are now down to zero, Judge.

THE COURT: When employees upload or when they do

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anything, whether it's a like or it's called white-listing or burying or anything -- I guess I have a question of exactly how it works. The employees have a badge on it. Right? So if an employee says I like this or an employee uploads something, it will indicate that a Vimeo employee did that. Right? Because there will be a badge icon of sorts. Is that right?

MR. RASKOPF: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure that I understood that.

MR. RASKOPF: That's all right. But, as I say, it doesn't mean that the mere fact that whatever they're doing has something next to it does not mean that they're created in their official capacity. I think all you have to do is look at the videos and you'll see that.

So for the sake of completeness, I'll briefly address willful blindness. Under Viacom the only other way to demonstrate knowledge is to show that Vimeo was willfully blind to obvious -- obvious -- infringement in the clips in suit.

And as I stated earlier under Viacom, evidence of willful blindness, like both actual and red flag knowledge, must relate to the individual clips in suit. So there's no evidence at all in this record— I know you asked me about it, but there's no evidence at all in this record that Vimeo was willfully blind to any of the 199 clips we just addressed. They don't really make an argument to the contrary.

1 Infringement --

THE COURT: What is the difference, really, in this context between willful blindness with the specific instance of infringement and red flag knowledge?

MR. RASKOPF: Sure. I gave you the example of red flag knowledge.

THE COURT: Right. What would an example of willful blindness in this context be?

MR. RASKOPF: Okay. So Vimeo gets an e-mail from a user, and the e-mail says I just uploaded to Vimeo a complete rip of a feature-length film that I didn't make and I didn't have permission to do so. Let's say that that particular user has five hundred videos in his account. So he says, Do you want me to send you the URL for the video? I just uploaded and ripped the Man of Steel. It's playing right now. I uploaded it. I don't have a right to it, but this kind of thing happens.

And so the user says, do you want me to send you the URL? Meaning that if that URL is submitted, then Vimeo has specific knowledge of a specific location for a specific clip. And instead of saying okay, Vimeo says, nah, don't send us the URL. We don't want to know about it. Okay? So there you have a situation in which Vimeo has deliberately avoided confirmation that a particular video is infringing in the face of facts suggesting a high probability that it is. Now, this

1 | is the law. That's the law. That's what willful blindness is.

Red flag knowledge is facts that make a reasonable person conclude that a particular video is obviously or blatantly infringing. This is the law we have. And so we talk about the Beatles, we talk about any— these are videos that happen to have music. And we went through the list of things that can't be known by Vimeo. And certainly none of this rises, not even close, not one of these clips rises, with the evidence that's been presented — discovery's over, motion for summary judgment. Someone's got to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the specific clips in suit.

And, your Honor, we don't believe that a single clip qualifies to go beyond this point. We think every one of these clips deserves safe harbor for the reasons that I stated at this time.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Mr. Frackman.

MR. FRACKMAN: Thank you, your Honor. If I may impose on the Court, they took my watch downstairs when I came in. So if you can give me-- is there a clock here?

THE COURT: Yes, there is. So I'll let you know.

MR. FRACKMAN: Part of the problem that I have responding is kind of the problem we had in doing our briefs. There's an embarrassment of riches here and I, frankly, don't

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know where it's best to begin, so I'll begin at the end if I may.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. FRACKMAN: I do suggest to the Court that not only is there a lot of material and a lot of evidence recited in our briefs, but frequently what the Court will find and what I found is that some of the same materials and some of the same documents and some of the same evidence overlap these various issues and so they have to be considered in a certain extent as a whole.

Let me make one quick comment while it's in my head on blindness. It seems to me the inability of Mr. Raskopf to provide a reasonable, understandable example of either willful blindness or of red flag knowledge goes back to really how he ended his presentation, which is how they began this case and how they began their brief: The DMCA is a notice and takedown That's what almost everything he said comes down to and that's what the Viacom case said is not the law.

So if you dissect -- and I'll start with willful I didn't quite understand the example, but I must blindness. say, if your policy, if your stated internal policy, is, among other things, don't ask/don't tell, then Mr. Raskopf's example disappears and there is no willful blindness under those circumstances.

And, indeed, your Honor, I would suggest as with

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knowledge, as with right and ability to control, as with inducement, you end up with -- again, as Mr. Raskopf argued, you end up with just complete freedom on the part of the internet service provider no matter what it says, what it does, what it instructs, what its policy is.

THE COURT: So is your argument, just to clarify, that the defendant need not be willfully blind to a specific instance of infringement but to the possibility of infringement generally?

MR. FRACKMAN: It's neither of those, your Honor.

It's somewhere beyond general knowledge because it requires something on the part of the ISP. It requires them to construct a service that is willfully blind. It doesn't mean that just with general knowledge of infringement and nothing more, but if there's infringement going on and you construct a service that makes you willfully blind— and I would submit is intended to make you willfully blind— then you are willfully blind to the infringement that's going on on the service.

Just like in Aimster, your Honor, that the person who ran the Aimster service constructed something so that he would be willfully blind to everything. He had a system set up so that he could argue plausible deniability. And the Court in Aimster, Judge Posner said, well, in those circumstances you have knowledge. And I think if you read the Viacom opinion —

THE COURT: Well, I was actually going to turn to

that. I was going to ask you how I'm supposed to read the language from the Viacom decision stating that "the willful blindness doctrine may be applied in appropriate circumstances to demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement under the DMCA." What do I do with that under your theory?

MR. FRACKMAN: I think what you do with it, your Honor, and as I read it, and as I think the only way to read it is, after all, you can't have specific knowledge of something that you're blinding yourself to. It's just a logical inconsistency.

So I think what the Court is saying, and does actually say, is that willful blindness imputes knowledge, a deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge, imputes the necessary knowledge. And quoting from the eBay court, here's what the Second Circuit said: A service provider is not permitted willful blindness. "When it has reason to suspect that users are infringing a protected mark, it may not shield itself from learning of the particular infringing transactions."

And going on, quoting, "The willful blindness doctrine may be applied, in appropriate circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement."

It's implied. It's implicit. It's the penalty you pay for setting up a system where you're using copyrighted material and then you shield yourself from making a determination. You

1 don't ask; you don't tell. As Mr. Pile said, we ignore music.

All of these, by the way, all of these internal documents are far more important than Mr. Raskopf alluded to, and I'll get to that in a moment.

They set up their entire website globally and intentionally and told everybody to be willfully blind. If they hadn't been, as we pointed out in our papers, it would have been readily obvious — and I think they admit it — it would have been readily obvious that these were commercial recordings that could not be used without permission. They had the names of artists. They had the names of record companies. They had all the indicia of being a copyrighted commercial recording.

THE COURT: Do you have evidence that Vimeo was willfully blind to any of the specific videos in suit?

MR. FRACKMAN: The specific ones in suit?

THE COURT: Yes, the 199.

MR. FRACKMAN: The reason I can't directly answer that is because I don't see how anybody could be willfully blind to a direct— to a specific infringement, to a specific use. It's either red flag knowledge or it's actual knowledge or, at the end of the day, you've built a system where your willful blindness demonstrates — as the Court said, demonstrates — knowledge. It's separate, obviously, from both red flag and from actual. It's separated by the Court from both of those.

So the answer to your Honor's question is, no, I can't point to one because I wouldn't know how to point to one. I really wouldn't. And I don't know-- I don't think Mr.

Raskopf's example was an example of willful knowledge, and I don't know how anybody could point to one unless you accept what I think is the reasonable interpretation.

And you do have to go beyond-- you do have to go beyond generalized knowledge. You have to look at what they were doing here. You have to look at how they built their system. You have to look at how they ignored music. You have to look how they didn't put music as something that was forbidden. You have to look at they didn't flag music. You have to look at how they white-listed infringing music and made it available. You have to look at all of those things and more. You have to look at how they didn't remove stuff. You have to look at how they induced -- and we'll get to that -- invited, taught.

THE COURT: What do you think a company like that, a service provider, that has 70-some-odd people, what should their obligation be to look into every song that, what, that they recognize? I mean, as a practical matter, what do you think they need to do?

MR. FRACKMAN: Well, let me take that for a moment, your Honor, because those are two different questions. Maybe they're ten different questions, actually.

The first thing is absolutely and without a doubt if they induce infringement — if we're talking about right and ability to control, you gave, I think, Mr. Raskopf a couple of examples of documents. And he said, well, those don't refer to clips in suit. They don't have to. They're inducement evidence. And inducement evidence does not refer, as the Viacom court was crystal clear, does not deal with specific infringements. If you induce, you're liable. And they induced. So that's number one.

Number two, in terms of knowledge, if I can go through it, I think there are several layers to it. Let me start with the staff. There is evidence in our reply documents that the way they wanted to characterize the ten people is just not accurate and not based on the records that we have. But leaving that aside, there's no doubt that those ten individuals made, uploaded, and appeared in infringing videos. Most of these wore a badge. They're not users. Their job responsibilities included making videos. They were frequent users. They were told to make videos to inspire other users. They didn't just create these; they uploaded them. They were identified with them. The music was identified. And it was accessible both on the website and in their profile pages.

So there's no way that you could disassociate those people from that material. And, clearly, they knew. They knew because when they had their depositions taken-- well, anyone

would know, I would think, that if you copy the Beatles, you're infringing somebody's rights. But when they had their depositions taken, they, frankly, admitted how they made it. And the website teaches others how to make infringing videos, including with the step of purchasing an MP3 from iTunes, a commercial recording, and syncing it into your video.

I would submit there's no way to get away from those. By the way, just as an aside, Mr. Fishel was an employee of Connected Ventures. We've shown that Connected Ventures at the time owned Vimeo. Connected Ventures is a defendant in the case. A minor point, because I think all ten of those are swept under the rubric of knowledge, of actual knowledge.

The other ones -- and I'll work my way up to the ones where they commented or liked, which, again, was part of their job; specifically instructed to do that. In order-- and they testified in order to like something -- and it's logical, of course -- you have to see it. And when you see it, when you see these, you know. You know that they're by artists, in our case a whole laundry list of artists who clearly are commercial artists. And I won't read them to you in detail, your Honor. You have them in the exhibits to our complaint. But they include, of course, the Beatles, Fergie, Nelly, The Four Tops, Gladys Knight, The Jackson 5, Tupac. There's something for everybody there. But they're clearly commercial recordings for which there is no permission.

Now, let me answer a couple of questions on that, on how would we know. First of all, the issue of maybe they're licensed is a red herring. As some of the courts say, and I think most frequently in *Fung*, record companies don't go around licensing individual people to use their recordings and videos. They just don't do it.

Number two, if they did, it would be a license to that individual. It wouldn't be a license to Vimeo to use it on its own website in a commercial purpose, for a commercial purpose, and obviously a very lucrative one. That's what they make their money out of, those videos which they say are enhanced greatly by music.

THE COURT: When you say that's how they make that money, are you talking through advertising? subscriptions?

MR. FRACKMAN: I'm talking about several different things. If I can finish this one thought first--

THE COURT: Please, go ahead. Absolutely.

MR. FRACKMAN: $\mbox{--}$ I'll try and come back to that.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. FRACKMAN: If I could make a note.

And, your Honor, Vimeo knows it's not licensed. It talked about gets licenses. A little bit more willful blindness there. It talked about getting licenses, but decided that they didn't want to spend the money. So the license issue I think in many ways shows the weakness of that aspect of the

case: How would we know?

Fair use, the same. Fair use is a defense to an individual user. First of all, there's no evidence here that any of these constituted fair use. Second of all, this is not the time to discuss fair use. That's at the liability stage. And, third, it's not Vimeo's defense. We're talking about direct infringement by Vimeo, not secondary liability in this instance where you have to have a direct infringer. They're the direct infringer. It's not fair use.

And, your Honor, we quoted Professor Jane Ginsberg in our papers, who basically said -- and I think it's self-evident -- that if those arguments succeed, then no service provider can ever have knowledge because they always can say that. They've come up with another one now: Maybe it's in the public domain. Well, again, no service provider could ever be found liable.

My colleague pointed out to me that if you look at Mr. Pike's video, one of the ten, and he is-- I'm sorry, Mr. Pile's video; he doesn't write very well-- he's one of the ten and he was a chief development officer. It's about Vimeo. The Street Team video is about Vimeo. Some of these are directly about Vimeo and how you disassociate yourself from that. And this was-- I have to emphasize this was their job. Their job was to make music videos to inspire. Similarly, their job was to comment and like videos to inspire; to put

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them on staff channels where everybody was automatically subscribed.

THE COURT: But is this different from what Judge Pauley found in the MP3/TCase? I believe that he found that personal uploads of employees were personal actions that were not within the scope of employment and could not be imputed to the employer. How is this different?

This is different, your Honor-- and I'm MR. FRACKMAN: not sure he was talking about uploads or downloads there. That's different. I seem to recall he was talking about downloads, but I may be mistaken. If you give me a minute, I might be able to...

> THE COURT: Sure.

MR. FRACKMAN: At the moment I can't locate it.

THE COURT: That's okay. You may proceed.

MR. FRACKMAN: Let me make the point that from my point, it doesn't matter. What we have here is that this was their job. This was their job. It had their badge next to it. It was on their profile page. They were instructed to do this as part of their job. And whether it happened -- although I don't think it did -- before or after, the fact of the matter is it continued to be performed after they became monitors or community members. That's an infringement. That performance is an infringement and they definitely were then part of Vimeo.

So if I can, just very quickly, we do have a chart

that was submitted to the Court that basically shows of the 199 works, ten were uploaded by employees, 25 were commented or liked on, and frequently when you look at these comments or likes, you can tell that they've obviously seen the material and they testified that they would have seen it in order to comment or like on it. Two are on staff channels, 20 are white-listed. Your Honor knows what white-listing means. They can't be flagged.

It's more evidence of willful blindness, by the way.

They can white-list an entire user and it makes no difference what you put up after that. You're a good guy, as

Ms. Mellencamp says. You're a good guy and you can put up whatever you want. Twenty of ours are white-listed and there's testimony that they look at stuff before they determine that someone is a good guy and can be white-listed. And four are buried where you also have to look at the material before you make that decision.

Then we also add to that, your Honor -- and Mr.

Raskopf didn't talk to about that -- the plus subscribers.

There are 30 plus subscribers. And the testimony I think from Ms. Allen was that they reviewed the accounts of plus subscribers to make sure that they are compliant.

And I believe there's even a M.O.D. tool for that. So we add those and we end up with 56 of direct infringement knowledge or, at the very least, because of what these

reportings were, red flag knowledge. There were recordings of well-known artists and well-known songs without any license or consent.

And, by the way, your Honor, I would point out there's not a single declaration from any of these employees that says anything about why they did it, when they did it, how they did it, whether they knew or didn't know. Nothing. And I would submit because they can't. They can't.

If I can get from there to -- your Honor I think did raise direct financial benefit. And our view is, as we put in our papers, is that there are several ways that there's a direct financial benefit. But the most direct way, I would think, is because there are advertisements on the very pages of our infringing recordings. And not only that, but the testimony is or the evidence is that Vimeo gets paid every time somebody goes to that page. Display advertisement. They don't even have to watch the video. They're attracted to it maybe because it says the Beatles.

They also have banner advertisements, little boxes, where Vimeo gets paid every time there is a click. So they get paid directly from advertising revenue on the pages that have our material.

In addition, those per-click advertisements are served by Google. They're AdSense advertisements. And there is testimony that they are targeted in some sense to the material

on the website.

In addition, as we pointed out to the Court, there's evidence of one major sponsor, CarMax, who decided and paid Vimeo to sponsor the lip dub channel. I believe it's 20 or 30 of our videos are lip dubs, as your Honor may know. CarMax advertised on pages that had infringing lip dubs and they were attracted because of the very nature of the material of lip dubs.

Finally, your Honor-- maybe not finally-- Vimeo decided for its own purposes to have at least two tiers of subscribers and their pro user pays more money. And they advertise for pro users right on the same pages that had our infringing videos.

And then, finally, we get to two other points on financial benefit. One is ever since my great-grandmother went to dance halls in the early 1900s, when music was played, infringing music was played, some infringing music was played, it was a draw. And all you have to do is look at these videos and turn down the music and you can see how important the music is. And they recognized how important the music is. It enhances; their word, I believe. It's a new type of music video is what one of the founders I think called it.

The draw is there. It's self-evident. It's the use of intellectual property and it brings people either to the website or permits them or makes them or encourages them to

stay on the website. And the amount of the resulting financial benefit is, at this stage of the game, not relevant. It's just not relevant. That's a damage issue. As long as it's a draw -- and they knew it was a draw. They said it was a draw. They encouraged it to be a draw. And as your Honor knows, the bar for direct financial benefit in the cases has been set very low. In this case we clearly, clearly, pass that bar.

Now, I can also point out to your Honor, as we pointed out to the Court, the term "lip dubs," which were inevitably and necessarily infringing, using commercial music — in fact, they taught their users how to infringe by making lip dubs and encouraged them— was one of the top, five top, referral terms from search engines. They—

MR. BERKLEY: Seven.

MR. FRACKMAN: They embedded the word "lip dub" in their meta tags, in their code, even if the video didn't apply to lip dubs because they knew people were looking for lip dubs. It was also one of the top search terms, keyword search terms, on Vimeo. And a fair amount of those lip dubs were ours, were infringing lip dubs, which kind of takes me, I think, maybe directly to the issue of inducement.

THE COURT: Can I just ask you a question about knowledge before you get to inducement? When I'm thinking about whether your evidence of Vimeo interacting with the videos in suit through liking or white-listing, et cetera, as

we talked about, am I considering in your view a question of law as to what constitutes knowledge or a question of fact that should be decided by the jury?

MR. FRACKMAN: I think in this instance it's a question of law because the key facts are undisputed. The key facts are undisputed. We know that these people made them. We know how they labeled them. We know they put them up. We know it was part of their job. We know it was stamped "staff," and we have evidence that it was during their employment. It doesn't matter whether it was during their employment. We know the specific videos. And based on that, they have knowledge. You know when you make one what it is and you know when you see one that identifies it. And most of these, if not all of these, have clear identification of what the music is.

So there really isn't anything, in my view, on those 55 plus, there isn't anything that would take that away from the jury. Moreover, if you took it away from actual knowledge, it's clearly red flag knowledge. Once they look at these those videos and they see all the indicia of both what's within in the video, which is our music, and how it's described, that subject of knowledge applied to any reasonable person, the conclusion would have to be -- knowing that you don't have a license to do it, would have to be that there's red flag knowledge, or else I would submit to the Court red flag knowledge becomes pretty useless, becomes moot.

THE COURT: Do you have any evidence of knowledge or awareness of the other videos other than the 55, the remaining 144?

MR. FRACKMAN: The position we have on that, yes, your Honor. Here's how I would argue this. And this is an overflow, perhaps one of those areas to willful blindness. The Vimeo people knew that music was integral to their website, to their videos. It makes a good video great, is what they said. The site really couldn't exist without music. They built the website in large part on lip dubs, on music.

On their face, the music is not incidental. It's throughout most of these videos. It has all of these indicia on it: Famous artists, plaintiffs' names, credits. Even several we point out to the Court are actually videos of a vinyl record that it has *Capital Records* on it. Widely known people.

And these people are sophisticated business people, on a business that relies on intellectual property. They protect their intellectual property. They even sell music now themselves. They even get licenses from their users, but not from us, so they knew it had to be licensed.

We know that these people were trolling the website.

We know that they had tools to go through the website. We know at one time they were looking, they say, at every video. As that got more difficult, they developed tools to look at the

video. We knew they were looking at tens or hundreds or thousands or more videos because they subscribed not only to—they not only got their own, but they subscribed to channels, to users. They went on the website to see what was Vimeoesque. They went on the website to delete material.

What we don't have, we don't have a declaration from any of these people saying what they saw or why they would not in the course of their exploration have seen these videos and have been able to determine through red flag knowledge that they were infringing. They know what a copyright is. They say that over and over again.

THE COURT: But they have no affirmative duty to monitor under Section 512(m). Right? So putting aside the ones for a minute where there was some interactions, on the other ones what's your argument?

MR. FRACKMAN: They have no affirmative duty to monitor, but— and that's to monitor ab initio. Once you start to explore, filter, monitor — in their words, police — you can't just do it to develop your website to ignore music. And that gets really to inducement, your Honor. It gets really to inducement. But once you start monitoring for the purpose of building a specific type of website, they set out to do something here. They set out to build a website that was not YouTube. That was different. That would redefine the music video. That they would curate, curate by policing, monitoring,

by setting up a system and a guideline-- and this comes true over and over and over again. We want -- our website is going to be original videos. Original videos, but not original music.

They eschewed videos that were not original to the user, but over and over again, when they saw it, when they talked about it, when they put their guidelines up, the only time we take down music is with a DMCA notice. So we want good music for these original videos, and that's going to be our website. And they went out to do it. And the way they went out to do it, your Honor, is how they induced. It's both inducement and control under Cybernet.

The control under Cybernet eliminated, in large part, the videos or the users they didn't want. Inducement, on the other hand— and these two joined together, although it's not necessary under Viacom, that you have both inducement and Cybernet—type control. But the inducement part of it is how they got the music. And what they did — purposeful conduct, which is what inducement requires, exerting substantial influence on the activities of users. They wanted this user, but they didn't want to pay for it, your Honor, I should say because, as your Honor knows, they calculated what it might cost, they budgeted for it. We have 10 to 20 percent infringing music on here. Here's what the record labels are going to ask for, but they didn't want to pay it. So they

induced their users to do it. They broadcast a message to stimulate others to commit violations. That's a quote.

And they did it in the variety of means, one or two of which your Honor pointed out to Mr. Raskopf. Responses to individual users which are evidence of inducement. Hey, guys—I'm reading, your Honor, from Exhibit 180. "Hey, guys, I see all the time at vime videos" — it's a typo, Vimeo videos — "(for example, lip dub) music being used, that is copyrighted. Is there any problem with this? Can I do it?

Answer from Mr. Verdugo, somebody high up in their community: "We allow it. However, if the copyright holder sent us a legal takedown notice, we would have to comply."

Back to DMCA takedown. Back to the position that YouTube took originally with Judge Stanton and the position that Viacom said was absolutely wrong.

THE COURT: Do you know if the person who wrote this e-mail uploaded one of the 199 --

MR. FRACKMAN: It doesn't matter. It doesn't matter.

As the Court in Viacom said, there doesn't have to be knowledge of any infringement, any specific infringement, as a result of inducement. When you induce, inducement doesn't have -- is different than the knowledge segment. When you induce infringement and you fall under the right and ability to control, you are liable for the results of that inducement. You've induced infringement. We show that there was

infringement. That's it. There's no specific knowledge requirement.

In fact, what Viacom says, "We remand to the district court to consider in the first instance whether the plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude YouTube had the right and ability to control the infringing activity and received a financial benefit." And earlier "Both of these examples" -- Cybernet and Grokster, inducement. "Both of these examples involve a service provider exerting substantial influence on the activities of users without necessarily or even frequently acquiring knowledge of specific infringing activity."

That's the price you pay. And we do have evidence that there was inducement of specific infringements. There's a very interesting series of— or an e-mail string between Mr. Pile and a user. It's Exhibit 329. The user says, "I have seen you video on Vimeo (very well done) and we are jumping on the bandwagon at our company and doing one for our end of financial year party and possibly post it. Did you apply for a license to use the song?"

Here's what Mr. Pile says to the user: "Michelle, we don't have a license to use that song specifically, however we do pay royalties on any music played on Vimeo." Outright lie and Mr. Pile admitted that in his deposition.

And then what happened is Michele, the user, put up

her video with our music on it. That's how inducement works and that's how it worked here.

And that wasn't the only example. There are others. There's a lip dub called Girls and Boys where I believe they said they were inspired by a lip dub that Vimeo did. So there is evidence, but you don't need it. They don't need to know about specific infringements; we don't need to know about specific infringements. I think the law is clear on that going back to *Grokster*.

But if I can just take a few minutes to finish up on inducement, because that's not the only way they induced.

That's not the only way they induced. Their own infringements were inducing. Probably the most inducing evidence you can find and probably unique to Vimeo, in terms of all of these cases, if you go up on a website and you see staff members putting up their own music, their own infringing music videos, well of course what's the natural inclination, the natural conclusion that you draw? But they didn't — and those included videos by their founder, by their head of technology, by the head of the community team, by the founder of Connected Ventures. These top guys are putting up vivid music videos, infringing our copyrights by the way.

So what more inducement can you have? But there is more. They instructed people how to infringe. They actually gave instructions, including a couple of videos at least that

infringed our rights. Exhibit 53 is a lip dub, includes

Smashing Pumpkins, which is an EMI song. And then on the same

page, here's what they said: "Check out these lessons to learn

more about how you can make videos like this one. And go to

Video 101," which is their tutorial, "editing sound and music

with Windows Live Movie Maker." And you go to their tutorials

and they tell you to use commercial music.

This is an overwhelming case, your Honor, of inducement. There isn't another one out there. And I'm not finished yet. They liked, commented, talked favorably.

Whether you call that knowledge or not — and it certainly is — a user, when he or she sees a video that has infringing music with a like or a comment, a favorable comment, by a staff member, that's inducement. That's inducement. And bearing in mind that lip dubs were their signature genre.

THE COURT: To satisfy Section 512(c)(1)(B), do you need to show that Vimeo induced infringement or do you need to demonstrate that Vimeo's inducement of infringement reflects its ability to control infringing context?

MR. FRACKMAN: If I understand, your Honor, number one, we did show that they induced infringement. But since you can't-- you don't have to tie inducement to specific infringements by parity of reasoning, you don't have to show that they induced a specific infringement. And I think we cited in our brief some authority for that.

The point is, as one of the courts said, maybe it's

Fung, it's not the specific videos; it's the construct that

Vimeo prepared and conveyed to the infringers. They conveyed

the idea that this was permissible. And once you do that,

you're liable for the consequences. And once the Court finds

inducement, they're liable for the consequences for all of the

infringements that we are able to prove because that's how they

ran their website.

If you do whatever you can to have somebody do something, you're responsible when they do it. And when you provide the information, the tools, the location, everything that's needed to do it, you're liable for inducement.

Otherwise, inducement would disappear, essentially, because you couldn't prove specific infringements. And otherwise Viacom would have said just the opposite of what the courts said. It would have said, Go back and see if you can prove inducement of specific infringements. The Court said, No, just the opposite.

Because you have the right and ability to control, you're responsible for what you don't control, especially when you're inducing people to do that.

So I hope I answered the Court's question.

I would point out to the Court, as your Honor probably knows, we have in the wings either an amended complaint or a new complaint that has a thousand infringements. Many of these were staff picks or modeled on staff videos, as well as others.

So the inducement continues, if you will.

THE COURT: You had asked me to tell you about time. Why don't you take just a few more minutes and then we'll hear responses from both sides.

MR. FRACKMAN: Okay, your Honor. So let me just finish going through inducement, because we're still not done with that.

Remember, they're broadcasting a message. As I left off, I think, they instructed people. They communicated, they had internal communications between themselves, among themselves, which is another way to prove inducement. They refrained from specifically saying you can't use music, even though one of their founders, Jacob Lodwick, sent a memo saying "I think the text on the upload page must say you can only upload a video if you are the copyright holder," and they decided not to do that.

And these are, your Honor, all in the record, but they did other things as well. When they finally— when they started to respond to DMCA notices— this is at SUF. 312— Somebody is asking them, Mr. Verdugo, if they can use music. And the response is, and it's typical, "Yes, you can, but if we receive DMCA takedown notices from the copyright holders, we have to comply with them." What clearer message can there be? Put it up. It will stay up as long as we don't get a DMCA takedown notice. And your Honor knows, I think from our

briefs, how difficult it is to continue to send DMCA takedown notices.

They finally morphed to what they call their canned response to this question if they can use music. And, again, although they did it indirectly, and the inducement message does not have to be direct, "We cannot opine specifically on this situation you are referring to. Adding a third-party's copyrighted content to video, generally, but not always, constitutes copyright infringement. Under U.S. law, should a copyright owner come across their copyrighted content on one of our sites, they can submit a takedown notification requesting that we remove the content. This same area of law affords the operator of the site some level of protection."

Kind of ironic, I would think, your Honor. They're basically saying the same thing again. A little bit more verbose. Put it up. If the copyright owner sends a takedown notice... When they're told we're putting up infringing music. And there are, as Mr. Raskopf alluded to, copy after copy after copy after copy after copy of these kinds of responses.

And then, finally, if I can make two more comments on inducement, your Honor. Filtering. As your Honor knows, there's no obligation to filter. But as your Honor also knows under *Grokster*, the failure to filter, especially when you're filtering lots and lots and lots of other stuff, is evidence of inducement. Selective filtering.

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And your Honor knows here they had all sorts of filters -- they're in the record -- to look at users, to look at their accounts, to look at videos, to look at television shows, to look at game playing, which they finally took off and were able to control. Taken off the system. To look at virtually everything on the system. That's why they designed it, devised it, 40 tools available only to Vimeo people. it reviewed, by some accounts, every day or almost every day. And then, on top of that, not only didn't they design or use one of these, a keyword filter -- they used the keyword filter for movies. So they would search for Gone with the Wind. if it popped up, they'd check it out. But they didn't search for Beatles. They didn't search for White Christmas. Maybe they did, because that's a movie also. But they could have easily done it, as our expert says. Our expert -- and they don't have an expert. The reason they don't have an expert is we took his deposition and he was able to determine at his deposition several recordings, at least one Beatles recording, using an app on an iPhone, on Vimeo. But in addition to that, we know that they spoke to Audible Magic, a well-known content filterer, used and referred to in other cases, they didn't want to pay the money for it.

THE COURT: But do you think that it was Congress's intention to penalize a website's development of sophisticated tools that stopped some incident of infringement just because

1 it doesn't do enough?

it doesn't do enough? I mean, isn't that your argument? It does some, but it doesn't do enough?

MR. FRACKMAN: They're not developing it to stop infringement. They're developing them, by their own testimony, to mold their website. They are using these not for the purpose of stopping infringement. It's all part of their game plan to build a website that has commercial music on original videos. And when you do that — and the cases are clear. What they say in some of the documents, we're straight—out controlling. We're fascist. We're editorializing. That's what they're using these for. But they could have used them to locate music.

And the cases are clear, going back to *Grokster*, I believe, in the Supreme Court, that the failure to implement the filtering tool is evidence of inducement. It's not inducement in and of itself. Under these circumstances, where they had all these other tools to use for their own purposes, where they could have been adopted and adapted to get music, that's evidence of inducement.

And then I could go on and on, your Honor. I'll make one other point, I think, which maybe at the end of the day is a minor point that I missed, but it sort of seals the deal in my view. They had an award, Vimeo awards that they advertised, they put out a press release. It's in the record. It was a big deal called "Captured," was the award. It was our music.

They put up for a public award our music. Inducement.

Inducement. I don't know any other word that you could use to characterize it. You see Vimeo itself nominating for an award an infringing video.

And then there is one final thing, and that's what the courts also talk about, and that is inducement when a website capitalizes on taking infringing customers away from another website. In their internal documents, it's Exhibit 376, under "Themes and Trends," they say, "People want an alternative to YouTube for a variety of reasons, and Vimeo is showing early signs of capturing the defections."

Well, I'll tell you, at least in part, why they captured the defections. Exhibit 28 to my declaration is an infringing video. It's part of 28. I stand corrected. An infringing video, infringing our music. And here's what the user said: "Can't think of a title. Number 15 [bracket] blocked by YouTube because of copyrights from EMI."

Here's another one that's ours: "It was originally made for YouTube, but since YouTube doesn't allow EMI music and videos, I couldn't upload it."

And then, finally— and these are examples, your

Honor— "Copyrights are stupid. This video was supposed to go
to YouTube, but it deleted the song so it's going here now."

I have a lot more to say, but at the risk of overstaying my welcome, I'll sit.

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THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Frackman.

Mr. Raskopf, any response?

MR. RASKOPF: Yes. Thanks, Judge. I'm going to be very, very brief. I know the Judge wants me to be brief, and I will be. I'm just going to touch the clips in suit issue and turn it over to Rachel to deal with this Grokster thing that has been brought to the floor by Russ.

The case on the clips in suit is dead on arrival, as I believe has now been made obvious here, because the music -- we have videos here with some music on them. The test is whether the music on the video is blatantly or obviously infringing upon mere inspection. That's the question. And none of these are like that. None of these videos are like that.

The big thing that they talk about is lip dubs? I'd like to see the case that says that a lip dub infringes copyright rights, the music -- the copyrighted music. There is no case. As far as I'm aware, there is none. And they didn't cite you a case for that because when music is put into a video, well, the music is transformed. It tells a different This is copyright Fair Use 101.

Now, the question whether a particular case winds up infringing or not is not Vimeo's problem. That's a problem between the plaintiff and someone who uploads that video. infringement -- the test for Vimeo is whether that infringement is blatant or obvious.

In the Cheah declaration, we take down -- we show you examples of taking down videos that don't look right to us, that are obviously infringing even without a DMCA notice. But this is not-- we just do that as a matter of course. That's Cheah, Supplemental Cheah 3.

So what I'm here to tell your Honor is that this is a very carefully constructed statute and it's been very carefully and well-interpreted by the Second Circuit in Viacom. Let's have in mind that a service provider—a safe harbor cannot be conditioned upon a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity.

So this is how— so the Second Circuit understands the ISP's obligations, takes common law rights and articulates them in a way that makes sense given the fact that there's only so much that an ISP is supposed to do in order for it to function the way Congress intended it to function. And in that range of activities, there's a limited role in which we might have some issue, which does not appear here because any specific clip has to be, upon mere inspection, blatantly or obviously infringing.

They don't show you one of those. There isn't one.

And that's all they have, as I told your Honor, is, at complete best: We may have seen a video. That's it. And discovery's over. I don't have to put in an affidavit. I don't have to say anything. Okay? The best, all they have for any one of the 55 videos is we commented, we liked. Whatever. That's it.

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That's the whole case. And that is a complete failure, which is why we're now talking about likening Vimeo to the LimeWire Grokster line of cases. And I'm pleased to allow Rachel to deal with that question.

Thank you for allowing us all this time. I appreciate it, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. RASKOPF: Yes.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: I'll now say good afternoon. I'll try to be brief, your Honor. Mr. Frackman has covered a lot of territory here.

I guess we'll start with the inducement theory of right and ability to control. I'd note that I think everything we heard from Mr. Frackman was about comments on using music. And, again, the fundamental failure of that argument is that music does not equal infringing music. They are two very, very separate things. There's nothing wrong with using music or other creative content. There's a problem with using infringing music or creative content. We didn't hear anything suggesting that that is what Vimeo is encouraging users to do. Telling someone how to sync an audio file with a video file is not an act of infringement, nor is it an act of encouraging others to infringe.

Now, Mr. Frackman read from the greatest hits, this handful of stray comments in six or seven e-mails that were

submitted with the briefs regarding one-to-one e-mail conversations between a Vimeo staffer and an individual. So all of those comments put together relate to six, seven videos out of 45 million that have been on Vimeo. That is not inducement. That is not *Grokster*.

I believe I also heard Mr. Frackman say any time there's an encouragement to use music, it must be an active inducement because major recording artists don't license their music. It must be an infringement. And of course we know that's not true, but it's not just a matter of common sense. Exhibit 7 to the Cheah declaration attaches a number of counter notices where, upon ordinary inspection, if Mr. Frackman were correct, you might say, Well, gosh, there's a video of Kanye West, for example. The user name doesn't say Kanye West. Maybe that's not authorized.

Of course that's not the standard. Vimeo got a counter notice in response to a takedown demand sent about a Kanye video. The counter notice was from a man named Nabil who said, Hold on a second. I'm the director. I have a right to display that video. And then I believe he even went and got a letter from Kanye or from the recording company. So that's Exhibit 7 to the Cheah declaration.

There are a number of examples where commercial music was used in the video, was taken down, and we received a counter notice saying, Put it back up. We have rights.

I believe— I'm going to try to stay in order here, on right and ability to control. I'll come back to financial benefit, because I believe Mr. Frackman switched back and forth between those two. He said, Vimeo built it's website on lip dubs. First of all, as Mr. Raskopf explained, a lip dub is not a dirty word. It is not an active infringement, per say. And there's also no evidence in the record that Vimeo built its website on lip dubs. I'm not sure where he got that.

I believe I also heard Mr. Frackman says Vimeo looks at every video, and that is also incorrect. There's no evidence in the record of that. And we know, again, that there are 43,000 videos uploaded per day. Vimeo does not review every video.

I believe I also heard Mr. Frackman say there's no evidence of what Vimeo employees saw when they looked at— or assuming they looked at certain videos that were tagged. Well, we, Vimeo, did not depose Vimeo employees. The plaintiffs did. And they didn't get any testimony confirming or suggesting that anything that any employee saw, that they knew or understood that to be infringing. So that means there's no evidence in the record of that.

That was to your question of whether, is there a question of fact here on these issue or not? There's not because there has to be a disputed fact to send to the jury. You cannot send a case to the jury on pure speculation as to

what might have been in the minds of Vimeo employees when they allegedly tagged a video or liked a video. You have to have competent evidence to give that jury so that there's something to resolve. And there's just no evidence on their side on the issue of knowledge.

I also believe I heard Mr. Frackman say—sorry, that was me — once you start monitoring, you can't stop. So if you do a little bit of monitoring, then that suggests that you have the right and ability to control. And, again, that's a nonstarter because we know that there is no obligation to police, and right and ability to control means doing something other than removing ex post anything that you might see on the site that is alleged to be infringing.

And we also note that Viacom rejected that exact same argument. This is the remand decision from the district court in April of this year. Viacom made this same argument. They said, well, YouTube disabled community flagging for infringement and they declined to develop a feature to send automated e-mail alerts to copyright owners when illegal content was uploaded. And they eventually stopped monitoring their site for infringements. Instead, waiting until YouTube received a takedown notice from the actual copyright owner identifying a specific infringing clip by URL and demanding its removal from the site. So that was what Viacom argued and the Court rejected it.

That evidence, the Court said, proves that YouTube, for business reasons, placed much of the burden on Viacom and the other studies to search YouTube— the other studios to search YouTube 24/7 for infringing clips. That is where it lies under the safe harbor. But the Court made short work of that argument and went on to say "YouTube's decision to restrict its monitoring efforts to certain groups of infringing clips, like its decisions to restrict access to its proprietary search mechanisms, does not exclude it from the safe harbor regardless of its motivation."

In other words, if a service provider decides to be a good internet citizen like Vimeo and like YouTube, it makes efforts to try to combat infringement whatever way it can, whether it be through some filtering or some automated tools to catch full-length, you know, 30-minute clips that are probably sitcoms or something like that. That does not defeat safe harbor. You don't punish that conduct; you reward it.

Next Mr. Frackman said-- I believe you asked a question, your Honor. He read an e-mail from Dalas Verdugo saying not that you can commit infringement, but simply saying you can use music if you want.

And you asked, Well, did Mr. Verdugo upload one of the 199 videos? Did he have anything to do with those?

And the answer to your question is, No, he did not.

And, again, I point out the question to Mr. Verdugo

was, Can I upload music? Not Can I infringe? Or, I don't have rights; is this okay? I don't think this is a fair use; can I do this anyway? I'd like to infringe on your website. There's no evidence like that in the record. Explaining how to use music is not the same as fostering or encouraging infringing music.

I'll also point out that none of the 199 videos have any connection with the six or seven stray e-mails that Mr. Frackman quoted into the record.

THE COURT: Just back to the Verdugo e-mail for a minute. What it says is "Hey, guy, I see all the time at" -- there's a misspelling, but -- "Vimeo videos, (for example lip dub) music being used that is copyrighted. Is there any problem doing this? Can I do it? Thanks."

Answer is, "We allow it, however if the copyright holder sent us a legal take down notice, we would have to comply. Best wishes."

Suggesting that you can go ahead, even if it's copyrighted, but we're only going to do something about it if we get a legal takedown notice.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Well, the DMCA does set forth the notice and takedown procedure, and that comment alone does not in any way endorse or support any active infringement. If the user uploaded a video that was clearly infringing and somebody saw it and satisfied, you know, the red flag test,

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then it would have to come down. But everything he said there is true --

THE COURT: But if a video with infringing music had been uploaded after this e-mail, would Vimeo have been willfully blind or on red flag notice?

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Definitely not because copyrighted music, again, does not equal infringing music. For instance, it could be that this fellow went and created a video with a three-second de minimis sampling of the intro to a song or something like that. Well, of course, de minimis use of a copyrighted work is not infringement. And there obviously could also be a fair use. It could be a longer clip, but clearly used for parody or satire or something else.

So, no. Telling someone, you know, yes, that you can use copyrighted music is not inducement to infringe. Moreover, again, we're talking about a handful of stray e-mails and what the plaintiffs are trying to suggest is that that's the real policy. Not everything that's on Vimeo's website, not their standard response that they send to the hundreds or thousands of people whose videos get blocked in response to a takedown notice, not the terms of service that have been published on the website for the last seven, eight years. That's not the policy. It's this random e-mail from Dallas Verdugo in 2008. That's the real policy. And that's just not reality. That's not what the record shows. That is not sufficient to create a

triable issue.

We know what Vimeo's policy is. It's stated all over the place. Mr. Frackman read an excerpt from the canned response, the standard response that Vimeo sends in response to questions like this. Dallas's was a stray comment. I don't think there was anything wrong with it, but it was a stray comment. The official policy is, I believe, Exhibit 1 to the Cheah declaration. And Mr. Frackman read— to the Supplemental Cheah declaration. Mr. Frackman read part of it, but then he stopped, so I'd like to read the whole thing.

He read you the following part: "Under relevant U.S. laws, should a copyright owner come across their copyrighted content on one of our sites, they can submit a takedown notification requesting that we remove the content. This same area of law affords the operator of the site some level of protection from claims of copyright infringement when dealing with user-generated content." That's where he stopped.

Let me keep reading. "The same protection does not apply to the actual poster of the content."

So Vimeo's official policy is to tell users, Don't do it. You don't get safe harbor. You are not an ISP. That is the opposite of inducement.

And I believe I also heard Mr. Frackman say that, well, all of the filtering tools that Vimeo uses, they don't use that to combat infringement. They use it for some other

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purpose. I don't quite understand that part of his comment.

But the first part of his comment is incorrect.

Mr. Pile submitted a declaration on our motion.

Paragraph 24 says "Vimeo removes videos that violates the terms of service to set an example for users and demonstrate that Vimeo takes these policies seriously." And there he's talking about the filtering tools in paragraph 24 that Vimeo uses that filter out things like full-length movie clips and television shows, because they tend to be an exact certain length and so automated filters can sometimes find those and filter them out.

Again, that's what a good internet citizen does. It's not -- the act of making some attempt to combat infringement on your system without waiting for a DMCA notice is not a basis to deny safe harbor.

THE COURT: The response that you read in Exhibit 1, how long has Vimeo been providing that response?

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: The one I'm holding here, your Honor, is from April of 2009.

THE COURT: Right. I see that. But you said that this is—— I believe you described it as a canned response of some sort.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Okay. Your Honor, I believe that if you look at all 80 examples in supplemental Cheah Declaration Exhibit 2, you'll see this response going back to the middle of 2008. There are 80 different instances.

I would also direct you, again, on the issue of what is Vimeo's policy with respect to music to supplemental Cheah Declaration Exhibit 2. Again, not a random, stray e-mail from five years ago from Mr. Verdugo, but rather to Vimeo's posted policies. And Exhibit 2 says: "Are we allowed to have music in our videos?" And then it explains Vimeo's policy, but obviously infringing music is not allowed. It's not to say no music is allowed. That's not Vimeo's policy, nor does it need to be. Infringing music is not allowed.

So that would be, again, the fact that what Vimeo has submitted is affirmative and overwhelming evidence of its policies on its website, in e-mails, et cetera. A random, stray e-mail here and there from an employee who maybe didn't quote it just right or didn't get it just right does not create a triable issue as to what Vimeo's policy was. In further support, obviously, is the extensive record of takedowns in this case enforcing that policy.

THE COURT: And how long has this answer effectively been up on the website?

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Exhibit 2? I'll have to check with my team on that, but I do see that obviously the print date on this page --

THE COURT: No, I see the date. I'm just wondering how long this— it's phrased as an answer — but how long this answer or policy has been up on the website.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Okay. My understanding is it's about the middle of 2008. It's about the same time period as the canned response that we talked about in Supplemental Cheah Declaration Exhibit 1.

You also asked a question of Mr. Frackman, your Honor. You said, Do you have to show that the inducement influenced the right and ability to control, or do you just have to show inducement?

And, you know, the answer is, of course, the former. This is not a merits motion. We're not moving on liability. The plaintiffs are not here presenting their case in chief on their claims of inducement on the merits. Rather, we're just talking about DMCA safe harbor and the Second Circuit's opinion that, depending upon the circumstances, you might be able to show right and ability to control if you see the type of conduct that we saw in *Grokster*: Active inducement of infringement, where you are actually participating in the creation of this content through advice, through encouragement, through direction, or what have you, but it's infringing. Not just advice on content, but advice to infringe.

There's no evidence of that here. Everything we've heard talks about a handful of stray e-mails talking about, again, six or seven videos out of the 45 million, that's what they came up with in opposition to our motion where there's some advice about using music. No advice about infringement.

I'm just trying to make sure I covered everything, your Honor. I think those are all of Mr. Frackman's points on inducement.

So I can move on to, just quickly, financial benefit unless your Honor has any other questions--

THE COURT: No, thank you.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: -- on inducement.

Oh, sorry, I have one last point about the music equals infringement paradigm which I believe is not supported by the case law or the facts.

And I mentioned earlier that, again, to Mr. Frackman's comments that, well, if there's commercial music, it must be infringing. Not only is that, I don't think, supported by logic, but I mentioned also that the Shelter Capital Ninth Circuit 2013 decision made reference to this argument that UMG had made in that case. And the Court said, "As an initial matter, contrary to UMG's contentions, there are many music videos that could, in fact, legally appear on Veoh. Among the types of videos subject to copyright protection but lawfully available on Veoh's system were videos with music created by users and videos that Vimeo provided pursuant to arrangement."

So just the point being that, again, this notion that lip dubs or videos with some music must be infringing is just not supported by the case law or the record here.

And just lastly, quickly, your Honor, on direct

financial benefit, Mr. Frackman made a couple of points. He said advertisements are targeted to websites. I believe the record on that issue is in the Mellencamp declaration, paragraph 8, which says, "other Than Vimeo's home page and the video upload page, display advertisements are not targeted to specific pages but are placed wherever there is available inventory on Vimeo pages." So that's the evidence in the record on whether there's some connection between the advertising and whether or not a video might be infringing.

He also mentioned lip dub sponsorship. CarMax sponsored a lip dub channel or promotion or something like that. Again, that's not relevant because lip dubs do not equal infringement. So whether or not there might have been some revenue tied to a lip dub promotion is not revenue tied to an act of infringement. We all know that lip dubs could be authorized, could be used in public domain music, could be a fair use, could be de minimis. It does not equate to infringement, your Honor.

And I think that covers it unless you have any other questions.

THE COURT: No. Thank you.

Mr. Frackman.

MS. HERRICK KASSABIAN: Thank you.

MR. FRACKMAN: I used to have a partner, your Honor, who used to say, I could call it a ham sandwich, but it would

still be the same thing. And that's exactly the argument we're hearing now. It might not be infringing. It's not infringing music. Well, it becomes infringing music when it's used without consent. And this is infringing music.

It's not, as the Veoh Court referenced, user music. There's not a bit of music that a user made up any of this music. The evidence is all to the contrary. It's not like Veoh said that Veoh may have done it pursuant to an arrangement. I believe it was an arrangement with another record company, Sony BMG. They don't license it from any record companies. So they don't have those outs here if they are, indeed, outs.

A couple of other points. This construct — and we've done it in our reply, so I don't want to belabor it.

Mr. Pile's construct that we now have takedown music because of a DMCA policy or a non-DMCA policy is just wrong. Their real position, repeated over and over again in the depositions, and it's in our brief, is, for example, Andrea Allen:

"Q. "So the policy was to permit any music, any copyrighted music, to be used on videos as long as the user created the video portion. Correct?

"A. Yes, unless we receive the DMCA takedown notice."

So that was their policy. They got nervous at the end of this motion period and they put in Mr. Pile's declaration.

If you look at the exhibits, they don't prove-- Mr. Cheah's

declaration, I should say. The exhibits, if you look at

them -- and we tried to point that out -- don't prove what he's
saying or what counsel is saying.

They had one policy, and that policy was original video copyrighted music. And that comes across over and over again. And that's why, among other things, the tools that they used, the tools that they used, are important. And that's why filtering is important here. They were filtering to make up their—to build up their brand, as they put it. And their brand was original video copyrighted music. And they did it in a whole number of ways. And they started out—I won't get into that.

The phrase "a few stray e-mails" I think resonates, because I think it's in one of the other cases. It may be Fung, it may be LimeWire, and it was discounted by the Court. Because one way to show intent is internal e-mails; one way to show intent are e-mails with users.

So among the exhibits, which I didn't have a chance to get to, are e-mails in community forums that are available to all their-- I don't remember what they said-- 20 million users.

THE COURT: What's that exhibit number?

MR. FRACKMAN: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Is there an exhibit number for that?

MR. FRACKMAN: Yes. I'll give you a few exhibit

numbers. Exhibit 162, Community Forums. Question was "I was

wondering if it's possible to legally use copyrighted music if you put it in a private channel," which of course it isn't.

And which, of course, comes back to a question your Honor asked, which is, willful blindness includes letting people put stuff in a private channel.

Andrea Allen, one of their people—— I'm sorry, Julia Quinn, one of the people whose music was taken down pursuant to a takedown notice, moved it to a private channel. We only found that out when we got their database.

But, anyway, Exhibit 162 is an example: "I was wondering if it's possible to legally use copyrighted music if it's private invite channel?"

"Technically no, but I'm sure the FBI won't be busting down your door anytime soon. There are too many people doing it for it to be enforced unless it's being used for commercial purposes." 162. To everybody.

User forum, Exhibit 29 to Mr. Lodwick. User posted a forum question: "I know you guys haven't been living under a rock, so I was wondering what is the risk of having lip dubs be included in 'Vimeo Obsessions' because they are technically copyright infringement."

Vimeo never answered that one.

Your Honor, there are others. They're all in the record.

One more that I found on the forum, a question: "I

uploaded a video to YouTube which is blocked at my school and I am showing it Wednesday. Vimeo isn't blocked so I'm going to use this instead. Plus the quality and everything else means I would use Vimeo anyway, but it has 'Don't Stop Me Now' in the background. Goes brilliantly with the video."

Answer by staff: "You can use the music. There are tons of videos on here with music. Just be sure to mention the artist, especially if it's something educational."

So while my colleague is looking, I'll make another point.

In an interview that, I believe it's Mr. Whitman gave, a request for judicial notice, Exhibit 1, he says, 'We got hundreds and hundreds of resumes,' Lodwick says. He's talking here about— the article is about lip dubs. "'We've got hundreds and hundreds of resumes,' Lodwick says." It put us on the map because you wouldn't expect a company to produce something like that." And he is talking about lip dubs. And it did put them on the map.

Another forum question: "I'd like to have a feature like the cast of One, but to show the tracks used as soundtrack on the clips." Mr. Lodwick responds, "Good idea. For now just tag the clip with the music, the Beatles, or Music Beck or whatever."

And then, finally, your Honor, on the home page-- and there are more, but I know it's getting late. On the home

page, lip dubbing became, on the home page, a Vimeo obsession, which are put on the home page, where they feature what they want to feature. And it says "Lip dubbing. Like a music video. Shoot yourself mouthing along to a song, then sync it

with a high-quality copy of the song in an editing program."

And then finally, your Honor, all of these videos, all of these videos that they didn't take down on their own volition, all of these videos that they put up, all of these comments, went to their millions and millions of users. On the 199 recordings on this schedule, they were viewed nine and a half million times. Oh, I'm sorry, 950,000. Wishful thinking. 950,000 times. On the ones on the new schedule that are infringing, I believe it was two million times. These are not stray e-mails. They show what they're communicating internally; what they're communicating outside.

By the way, your Honor, the Google ads, AdSense, which are one of the ads, type of ads, that are placed on the page, are textual in nature. That's what Google AdSense is. So there are ads that are not textual; there are ads that are textual. At the end of the day, it doesn't really matter. They both bring in money to Vimeo.

THE COURT: Any final remarks?

MR. FRACKMAN: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Any final remarks?

MR. FRACKMAN: Yes, your Honor. Two things, or three

things. I'm not sure where this blatant and obvious language comes from. I don't think it comes from the Viacom case in terms of knowledge. I think you have to have specific knowledge of the infringing videos. At least I didn't see it again when I took a look. But I'm not sure in the context here that it makes any difference.

I don't want to get into the repeat infringer policy. We spell it out in our papers. Your Honor asked some questions. I don't think you got answers. And I think it's pretty clear that they didn't have a "three strikes policy" until November of 2008, when they invented Purgatory. And they didn't have a written repeat infringer policy until, I think, 2011.

And, indeed, when two people who should know,

Mr. Lodwick and Mr. Verdugo, were asked at their deposition

about an infringer policy, one said "I don't know of any" and

the other one said "I don't know of anything in writing." It's

a strange policy to begin with, as your Honor knows, and I

don't think it's duplicated anyplace else. It's unusual in its

leniency.

As we spell out in our papers, they also didn't expeditiously remove. By the way, they keep saying expeditiously remove after DMCA notice. That's not what the statute says. Expeditiously remove after knowledge, not DMCA notice. And we've shown you they've had knowledge of these

things for years and years and years, including the stuff they put up. That's expeditious removal.

When it comes down to it— and I just want to make one final point that's argued in the brief, but obviously a new case since we argued it. And that's on the pre-'72 sound recordings. And your Honor probably knows of the Escape Media case, which I think puts an end to that argument. I think we have, I don't remember, but your Honor's schedule, maybe 20 including very, very valuable recordings of the Beatles that are pre-'72 recordings.

And the Escape Media case, understanding that it disagrees with MP3.com, but what it does is talk about the strict language of the copyright statute. And, frankly, pre-'72 recordings do not fall under the DMCA because they're not federally copyrighted recordings anymore than I could stand here and ask your Honor for statutory damages for pre-'72 recordings because they don't fall under the Copyright Act. And the Escape Media case cites to the copyright office study, and I think quotes it, which in no uncertain terms says we think MP3.com is wrong.

So I would submit that those pre-'72 recordings as a matter of law should be carved out and we're entitled to summary judgment on those as well.

So just to conclude, your Honor, we're not asking that Vimeo go out of business. We're asking that they do what

YouTube now does, what Veoh now does, what pretty much everybody else now does, which is pay for their music. And they can do it, they can find it, or they can block it. There are all sorts of things they can do. But when you come to the end of it, there are two principles: Number one, they set out, unlike any other website — unlike Veoh, unlike YouTube — to build a certain type of website and they built it in part on the backs of copyrighted music that they didn't pay for.

Number two, when you parse through, I would suggest, the argument that counsel has made, the argument is an ISP can never be excluded from safe harbor. They can't be excluded because they'll never know. They can't being excluded because they'll never be willfully blind. They can't be excluded because they can't induce specific infringements. They can't be excluded because it may be licensed or it may be fair use. And that's just not what the law is.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I'd like to thank all of the lawyers for their excellent advocacy here today and in the briefs and I will reserve decision.

Thank you. Have a nice day.

MR. FRACKMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. RASKOPF: Thank you, your Honor.

(Adjourned)